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AGENDA IV.C.
Aggressive Smugness: The United States and
International Human Rights
Bryant G. Garth*
The United States is at once both the best friend and most stri-
dent foe of international human rights. The eighteenth century
ideal of the "rights of man" helped to inspire the American revolu-
tion, and this tradition has provided considerable impetus for the in-
ternational human rights movement.1 After the Second World War,
in fact, Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States was a key figure in
the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
development of the International Covenants.2 And it is probably
true that leaders in the United States invoke the language of human
rights unusually often and with particular vigor in international dis-
course.3 Every year the Department of State prepares a lengthy
study entitled Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and sub-
mits it to the Congress pursuant to legislative mandate.
Yet the United States has yet to ratify any of the major interna-
tional human rights agreements; nor does it participate in the
human rights conventions of the International Labor Organization.
Remarkably to the outsider, the United States Senate still has failed
even to ratify the Genocide Convention of 1948. In short, the United
States has chosen to stand aloof from the burgeoning international
institutional and legal framework for the protection of human
rights. That is why an appropriate title for this report is "aggressive
smugness."
Since the basic situation in the United States is well-known, this
report will not provide detail on the domestic setting for the protec-
tion of human rights. It will begin by summarizing the domestic in-
stitutional situation, linking it to the prevailing domestic political
ideology, and discussing why, with a few exceptions, the United
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. L. Henkin, The Rights of Man Today (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978).
2. J. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure
(Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers, 1984).
3. See, e.g., W. Korey, Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord (Euphrata, Pa.:
Science Press 1983).
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States has opted out of the international framework and remained
essentially smug.
The second part will explore the aggressiveness that can also be
found, especially in three areas: (1) treating international human
rights as customary international law or a plausible interpretation of
the U.N. Charter; (2) using international standards in the implemen-
tation of U.S. foreign policy; and (3) promoting international human
rights through the activities of non-governmental organizations.
The third part will then critically assess the approach found in the
United States.
I. The Domestic Setting and the Protection of Human Rights
One proposition provides the starting point. Almost no one in
the United States would trade the protections of human rights in do-
mestic law for the promise of an international scheme. The domes-
tic scheme is basic to the U.S. self-image, and the reasons for that
premise are well-known. The written constitution, the Bill of
Rights, and judicial review by the Supreme Court comprise the insti-
tutional structure for federal law; and each state has its own consti-
tution and its own supreme court. This general pattern represents
an article of faith among the American public.
Among the most notable achievements of the U.S. Supreme
Court in interpreting the U.S. Constitution are in the areas of free-
dom of speech and of the press, protection against discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion and, to a lesser extent, gender;
safeguards for criminal defendants, including a mandate to provide
counsel and to exclude illegal confessions or illegally-obtained evi-
dence; and liberal requirements for an adequate hearing before
property can be taken from an individual by the state, even tempo-
rarily. Whatever the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court, most
of these doctrines are solidly entrenched in American constitutional
law.
Those who oppose the ratification of the major international
human rights treaties cite these achievements and make three major
arguments. One, which had much more power before the 1960s, was
that such treaties would disrupt the balance of power between the
federal and state governments. States, the argument went, were the
primary protectors of human rights for individuals; and the stan-
dards set out in a treaty would unduly or perhaps unconstitutionally
federalize the law. States would lose the ability to experiment with
their own approaches to the protection of human rights. Variations
of this argument still surface,4 but it has lost much of its force today.
4. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 98th
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Federal law today substantially overshadows state law in the human
rights area.
Second, it is feared by opponents of the conventions that ratifi-
cation will allow foreign dominated institutions and perhaps also
foreign countries to assume jurisdiction over matters that can be
handled adequately within the United States. According to former
Senator Sam Ervin, testifying recently against ratification of the Ge-
nocide Convention, the Convention would subject "our citizens and
other persons within our territorial jurisdiction to trial, conviction,
and sentence for acts of genocide committed in the United States by
an international penal tribunal where they would not be surrounded
by the constitutional safeguards and legal rights accorded persons
charged with domestic crimes."'5 In the words of Howard Phillips,
Chairman of the Conservative Caucus, "There is absolutely no
sound argument for making American citizens subject in any way to
the World Court, or other international bodies heavily influenced
and sometimes dominated by personnel from Communist dictator-
ships.' '6 These views still have much support even though the Rea-
gan administration has chosen to favor ratification-at least in
principle--of at least the Genocide Convention. The negative opin-
ion is probably enough once more to prevent ratification of even the
Genocide Convention.
Third, there is a widespread concern that treaty obligations
could undermine or otherwise adversely affect rights protected cur-
rently in the United States.7 This fear has led the Presidents who
have submitted the human rights treaties to the Senate to propose
reservations or understandings that would, for all practical purposes,
assure that the conventions would have no impact on domestic law.8
President Carter thus sent the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the American Convention
on Human Rights to the Senate on February 23, 1978; but he in-
cluded reservations, for example, on freedom of speech,9 capital
Cong., 2d Sess., on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide Sept. 12, 1984, at 7 (Comm. Print 1984).
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id. at 81.
7. This is the argument for limitations on the genocide convention, criticized in
LeBlanc, "The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed
U.S. Understanding," 78 American Journal of International Law 369 (1984).
8. R. Lillich, US. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties: With or Without
Reservations (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1981).
9. For example, Art. 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination condemns propaganda and organizations based on racial ha-
tred or superiority. The U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to permit such advo-
cacy of ideas on the theory of "free marketplace of ideas."
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punishment, 10 and double jeopardy," in addition to a general under-
standing that the provisions of the two covenants would not be "self-
executing.' 2 Ratification would accordingly have had no specific
impact on U.S. law.
The current attitude, therefore, clearly reflects an unwillingness
among policy makers to effect changes in the positions of human
rights in the United States through the mechanism of new interna-
tional obligations. Some commentators take a different approach,
and a few have promoted the idea that the eighteenth century con-
stitution of the United States can in effect be modernized by ratifica-
tion. They hope, for example, that the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights might foster the development
of new protections of "social rights.' 3 They note that in the 1960s
there was a movement in the United States to constitutionalize some
aspects of the welfare state, but it failed in part because of the limi-
tations of the U.S constitutional text. The current political climate,
in any event, as discussed below, is quite hostile to the creation of
"rights" to the governmental benefits and programs.
Indeed, many persons allied with the Reagan administration
have been arguing in recent years that the courts have gone too far
in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. 14 They wish to halt what they
see as a profligate expansion of rights led by legal activists and pro-
moted by federal judges. And they would favor a retreat to an inter-
pretation of the Constitution closer to the vision of the framers in
the eighteenth century. Within the United States, therefore, there
is very little momentum for the idea that the country should commit
itself fully to the "international bill of rights."
II. PROMOTING THE NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
The opinions of most commentators in the United States, re-
flected in the draft of the Restatement of the Law on Foreign Rela-
tions, understandably looks beyond new treaty commitments. It
emphasizes the binding nature of international human rights for the
10. An example is Art. 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which forbids the execution of persons under the age of 18 or pregnant
women.
11. Under U.S. law, it is not an unconstitutional violation of the double jeopardy
principle if there is a second trial by federal as opposed to state courts.
12. According to Professor Henkin, one defining U.S. principle in submitting the
treaty was that, "while the U.S. will adhere to this covenant, it will not agree to any
change in U.S. law as it is today." Henkin, "The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights," in R. Lillich ed., supra note 8 at 22.
13. See, e.g., Good, "Freedom from Want: The Failure of United States Courts to
Protect Subsistence Rights," 6 Human Rights Quarterly 335 (1984); M. Perry, The
Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale, 1982).
14. See, e.g., R. Morgan, Disabling America (New York: Basic Books 1984); T.
Sowell, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality (New York: William Morrow, 1984).
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United States and others regardless of the ratification of the major
instruments. The sources for the binding nature are seen to be the
U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, or sim-
ply customary international law.15 The draft Restatement, for ex-
ample, explains its emphasis on customary human rights law as
follows:
Almost all states are parties to the U.N. Charter, which
contains human rights obligations. While there has been no
authoritative determination of the full content of those obli-
gations, it is increasingly accepted that state parties to the
Charter are legally obligated to respect at least some of the
rights recognized in the Universal Declaration. A violation
of the rights protected by customary law... may be seen as
a violation of the Charter too.16
This emphasis on the Charter and customary law, although not
without detractors,17 has been used to make international human
rights significant both in the United States and with respect to for-
eign policy decisions. For present purposes three cases merit atten-
tion for their emphasis on international law in the U.S. courts. The
first points to the potential to fill gaps in the United States and the
others to using U.S. courts to punish abuses that take place
elsewhere.
In the case of Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,'8 the plaintiff
was an individual who had tried to enter the United States as part of
the "Freedom Flotilla" from Cuba in 1980. He was found to be "ex-
cludable" because he had committed a crime in Cuba, and was de-
tained indefinitely in a federal prison because Cuba would not take
him back. He sued to challenge the detention under federal law, the
U.S. Constitution, and international customary law. The federal dis-
trict court found that he had no constitutional rights because of his
status as an excludable alien, that federal law also did not protect
him, but that nevertheless "arbitrary detention is prohibited by cus-
tomary international law."'19 The case was justly celebrated by com-
mentators as a unique example of international law expanding the
rights of persons within the territory of the United States.20
Reflecting a traditional reluctance of the courts to base deci-
15. See, e.g., D'Amato, "The Concept of Human Rights in International Law," 82
Columbia Law Review 1110 (1982).
16. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations, § 701
(Tentative Draft No. 3, March 15, 1982).
17. See, e.g., Watson, "Normativity and Reality in International Human Rights,"
13 Stetson Law Review 221 (1984).
18. 550 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980); 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
19. 505 F. Supp. at 718.
20. See generally, "A Discussion of Human Rights in the 1980's," 4 Houston
Journal of International Law 133 (1981); "Symposium, Conference on International
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sions on international law, however, the Court of Appeals for the
10th Circuit declined to uphold the lower court's reliance on inter-
national law. Nevertheless, the appellate court also found that in-
ternational law should be taken into account in interpreting the
relevant statutes and the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.21 When in doubt as to the proper meaning of a constitutional
provision, accordingly, the decision suggests that courts should look
to international human rights provisions and try to interpret the
constitutional provisions to be in harmony.
Both these approaches, therefore, offer some promise for a do-
mestic impact of international human rights-at least in limited ar-
eas. So far they are relatively isolated decisions, but there is no
doubt that they provide good evidence that judges are today more
willing in the United States to at least entertain arguments that in-
ternational human rights have some bearing on the resolution of do-
mestic lawsuits.22
Such enthusiasm was also generated by the case of Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.23 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed a
lawsuit to proceed between Paraguayan nationals for torture and
death alleged to have taken place in Paraguay. The basis for the
cause of action in the courts of the United States was a little-known
law enacted in 1789 entitled the Alien Tort Claims Act. It granted
jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States. '24 According to the Court of Appeals, supported by an ami-
cus memorandum of the U.S. Department of State, "deliberate tor-
ture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless
of the nationality of the parties. '25 On remand, the district court
recognized a tort based on the law of nations,26 which then provided
the substance for a case granted jurisdiction by the Alien Tort
Claims Act. Accordingly, the court in 1984 awarded the plaintiffs
over 10 million dollars for the torture and death of the brother and
son of the plaintiffs.
Human Rights Law in State and Federal Court," 17 University of San Francisco
Law Review 2 (1982).
21. See generally, Christensen, "The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform
Constitutional Interpretation," 4 Houston Journal of International Law 39 (1981).
22. For a recent perspective see Lillich & Hannum, "Linkages Between Interna-
tional Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law," 79 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 158 (1985).
23. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
25. 630 F.2d at 884. The State Department Memorandum can be found in 19 In-
ternational Legal Materials 585 (1980).
26. 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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This remarkable civil lawsuit thus allowed U.S. courts to police
certain international activity by creating a tort for damages to rem-
edy violations of international human rights.2 7 Of course, it is not
clear how much this case extends beyond torture, nor its relation-
ship to the defense of act of state, cleverly circumvented in this case;
and the case also depends on the fortuity of finding the defendant
within the United States for the purpose of jurisdiction. The poten-
tial for such a legal development would thus be difficult to realize at
best. Even on limited terms, however, it is far from clear that this
precedent will lead very far.
Plaintiffs in the recent case of Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic28 tried to build on the holding of Filartiga. A number of Israeli
citizens and a few others who were the survivors and representa-
tives of deceased victims of an armed attack on a bus in Israel in
1978 brought suit in Washington D.C. They alleged torture and
summary executions against a group of defendants including the
Libyan Arab Republic and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The district court refused to grant jurisdiction, and the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, focusing on the problem of jurisdiction over the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization. The three opinions agreed that it
would be inappropriate to extend Filartiga to an incident where
there was not official torture. But they disagreed strongly as to
whether the Alien Tort Claims Act merely granted jurisdiction or
also recognized or created a substantive claim. They therefore rear-
gued the implications of Filartiga, with Judge Bork's opinion sug-
gesting that Filartiga cannot stand up in its finding that the U.S.
courts would provide a remedy for the torture. Thus, while the
holding of the Tel-Oren case may be defensible, two of the three
opinions 29 suggest a remaining hostility to lawsuits brought on the
basis of international customary human rights law and the Alien
Torts Claim Act.30
The enthusiasm for this vision of international human rights
law continues, nevertheless, and it is found also in the activities of
the various non-governmental human rights groups currently found
in the United States. Among the more notable groups are the Law-
27. See discussion in Blum and Steinhart, "Federal Jurisdiction over Interna-
tional Human Rights Claims: "The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala," 22 Harvard International Law Journal 52 (1981).
28. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), 726 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1984). See also,
Siderman v. Argentina (D.C. Cal. 1985) (not yet published) (sovereign immunity
held to prevent suit claiming damages for torture against the government of Argen-
tina); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985)
(sovereign immunity also).
29. One of the three opinions relied on the "political question doctrine." 726
F.2d at 823.
30. See the criticisms by D'Amato in 79 American Journal of International Law
92 (1985).
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yers Committee for International Human Rights, International
Human Rights Law Group, Americas Watch, and Helsinki Watch, in
addition to active branches of the International Commission of Ju-
rists and Amnesty International. It is probably fair to say that in re-
cent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number and
scope of activities of these and similar organizations. According to a
recent assessment of "public interest law" in the United States,
While a variety of fields such as civil rights, environ-
mentalism, and consumerism have become part of the insti-
tutional fabric of public interest in this country,
international human rights issues, most notably immigra-
tion topics, are becoming the new public interest frontier of
the Eighties with lawyers carrying their involvement into
U.S. courts, international forums, and courts abroad. 31
One of the focal points of these organizations is the foreign policy of
the United States as it applies to international human rights.
It is often stated by such activists that the Reagan administra-
tion has undermined the Carter Administration's focus on human
rights. According to David Carliner, the Chairman of the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group, for example,
I think that President Carter is entitled to enormous
gratitude from the people of the world because he has rec-
ognized the White House as a conspicuous public pulpit. A
statement made from the White House in support of human
rights that is made eloquently.., has an enormous electri-
fying effect for people not only in the United States but
particularly in those countries where people have suffered
violations of human rights.
This is not a question of diplomacy, of conducting nego-
tiations among various countries, but it is making the con-
cern about human rights a primary focus of administration.
I think that the [Reagan] administration has not used that
occasion.32
Using various forums, the human rights organizations keep persis-
tent pressure on the Reagan administration to modify its approach
to foreign policy.
It is important, however, to distinguish several aspects of U.S.
foreign policy as it concerns international human rights. First, the
statutory framework remains essentially the same as it was during
the Carter administration. Second, it may be, as the Reagan admin-
31. "Public Interest on a Global Scale," in Pipeline, Fall 1984 at 4.
32. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Orga-
nizations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Cong.
1st Sess. March 3, June 28, Sept. 21, 1983, at 90 (Comm. Print, 1984).
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istration insists, that the administration has changed more the style
than the substance of foreign policy on human rights generally.
And third, there has been a Reagan initiative in human rights; the
Reagan administration contends that its positive efforts on behalf of
"democracy" improve upon the Carter reactive approach.
Federal law requires that human rights be considered in various
ways in the foreign policy process. The first legislative enactment
came well before the Carter Administration. The Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1973 provided that it was "the sense of Congress" that
no foreign aid be given to a foreign government "which practices the
internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political
purposes. ' 33 Just prior to and during the first years of the Carter
administration, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 to strengthen that sense into a legal requirement:
Except under circumstances specified in this section
["extraordinary circumstances"], no security assistance may
be provided to any country the government of which en-
gages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights....
[T]he term "gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights" includes torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention
without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of per-
sons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those
persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, lib-
erty, or the security of person .... ,,34
The law also imposes a reporting requirement on the Executive
branch, which leads to the Country Reports already mentioned. And
numerous other laws also draw on a comparable basis on the situa-
tions regarding human rights in particular countries. 35 The reports
are generally recognized to be accurate in most respects, but of
course the real question is how the Reagan administration (and in-
deed its predecessor as well) uses the reports. It is clear, as noted
before, that the rhetoric of this administration has changed.
First, the emphasis is colored strongly by the administration's
strident anti-communism. That leads to the strongest possible state-
ments being made about conditions within Eastern Europe, the So-
viet Union and its allies, while it leads to a "quiet diplomacy" among
countries friendly to the United States and opposed to communism,
33. For the history see e.g., N. Petro, The Predicament of Human Rights 13 (Lan-
ham, Md.: University Press 1983).
34. 22 U.S.C. § 2304.
35. See International Human Rights Law Group, US. Legislation Relating
Human Rights to Foreign Policy (3d ed. 1982).
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such as Chile, El Salvador, the Philippines, and South Africa. While
the Carter administration also remained pretty quiet with certain
countries, such as Indonesia, it did act openly and with some power
in a few instances, such as with respect to Argentina and
Guatemala.36
The justification for the general differential treatment under
Reagan is in part a belief that such "authoritarian" countries may
evolve into democracies if we continue to support them, while our
opposition could push them toward communism. In the words of El-
liot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs, defending aid to El Salvador,
In Vietnam, in Nicaragua, in Iran, we were told that
the government we supported was corrupt and oppressive
and that the other side was the progressive side and would
respect democracy .... We want to be very sure that in a sit-
uation such as El Salvador, we do not trade the serious but
solvable human rights problems of today for a permanent
Communist dictatorship. Resisting the expansion of com-
munism is a key human rights goal.37
The administration is thus quieter about the abuses and less willing
to impose sanctions on U.S. "allies." That does not necessarily mean
that the Reagan administration is less committed than its predeces-
sor to human rights; indeed, the invasion of Grenada might be seen
as part of the Reagan approach to human rights. The administration
simply defines that commitment in terms of its general preoccupa-
tion with communism and the Soviet Union.
On the "positive side," in addition, the emphasis is on democ-
racy, which is "the nearest thing we have to a guarantee of human
rights. '38 Thus considerable importance is attached to elections in,
for example, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the Philippines
in the Country Reports for 1984, even though in other respects the
countries are criticized pretty strongly. According to Secretary of
State Schultz, "Elections are a practical yardstick of democracy,' 39
and the administration has celebrated the number of persons who
have participated in elections during the past several years.
36. Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practice,"
76 American Journal of International Law 246 (1982).
37. N. Petro, supra note 33, at 55.
38. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984
1440 (1985).
39. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. June 6,
26, and July 31, 1984 (Comm. Print 1984).
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III. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE U.S. APPROACH
The most obvious limitation on the approach of the United
States to international human rights is the dependence on custom-
ary international law rather than the important international trea-
ties yet to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. The general U.S. smugness
about its own human rights record and the reluctance of U.S. politi-
cians to submit to judgment according to foreign or international
standards clearly limits the role that international human rights can
play. It would be foolish to expect this situation to change in the im-
mediate future.
The United States is thus limited in the "law" that it can invoke
in its analyses of human rights conditions elsewhere. It cannot, for
example, easily argue that another country is in violation of commit-
ments undertaken according to one of the International Covenants.
This makes even more difficult the distinction between "law" and
"politics" or "ideology" that supporters of international human
rights seek to invoke. Human rights activists understandably fear
that they will be labelled as "political."
The Reagan administration not surprisingly has itself been criti-
cized on the ground that it fails to keep close enough to the law. To
quote again from David Carliner, Chairman of the International
Human Rights Law Group, "the human rights policy of this adminis-
tration is based on ideology rather than law. Communism is seen as
the worst human rights violation and to prevent that, other abuses
will be endured. ' 40 It is difficult, if not impossible, to make such a
neat distinction, but the effort to make it has had a clear impact on
all participants in these debates.
One vision of "ideology"-anti-communism-is easy to see, but
there is a deeper sense in which the current administration and
most U.S. groups are wedded to ideology in their positions on human
rights. A central domestic theme of the administration, for example,
has been to cut back on governmental services, promote private en-
terprise, and dismantle as much as possible of the apparatus of the
so-called "welfare state." The general faith is of course that eco-
nomic growth from private enterprise will make everybody, includ-
ing the poor, better off than they would be from governmental
programs.41 The Reagan opposition to communism relates closely to
this politico-economic vision.
Thus, while the Carter administration paid some attention to
the idea of "socio-economic rights" as represented in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and in the
40. Hearings, supra note 32, at 48.
41. See, e.g., note 14 supra.
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Universal Declaration, the Reagan administration has taken a hos-
tile attitude. According to Jeane Kirkpatrick, then U.S. Ambassador
to the United Nations,
[The Carter administration] used a concept of human
rights that was far too broad. It included not only legal per-
sonal rights, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest and tor-
ture and a guarantee of due process, and a full range of
democratic rights, such as freedom of speech, assembly,
elections, but also a full range of economic rights-the right
to food, shelter, education, medical care-which amounted
to the demand that all countries become affluent social
democracies. 42
The Country Reports since 1982 no longer refer to the terms, eco-
nomic and social rights. The explanation is that "the idea ... is es-
aily [sic] abused by repressive governments which claim that they
promote human rights even though they deny their citizens the ba-
sic rights to the integrity of the person, as well as civil and political
rights."43
This position leads the United States to an unwillingness to
question the distribution of goods, services, and even power in any
given society, as long as the economy is mainly privately owned and
certain formal rights are respected (or "gaining" respect). The cur-
rent attention to the process of elections as the key to democracy re-
flects a comparable unwillingness to look beyond the market. This
unwillingness in turn blinds policymakers to the broader issues that
are unavoidably linked to the election process.
As Garry Wills wrote in 1969,
Free elections are created by free men, not vice versa.
The machinery of election will not call up, establish, or
guarantee political freedom. The belief that it will reveals
our trust in "the market," our belief that competition of it-
self makes excellence prevail. Our faith in the electoral
process is based entirely on myths of the market. We think
we can be "open" to all political alternatives (we can-
not).... We think the process will work automatically for
others (it will not).44
Before elections take place, important questions of power must be
resolved, including who gets to vote, what the institutions of govern-
ment will be, and who will be permitted to serve in them. The U.S.
42. "Overhaul U.S. Policy on Human Rights? Pro and Con," U.S. News and
World Report, March 2, 1981, at 49.
43. Department of State, County Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982 5
(1983).
44. G. Wills, Nixon Agonistes 416 (New York: Signet 1971).
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emphasis on elections, to the neglect of other questions raised by a
broader and seemingly more "political" conception of human rights,
implies a particular ideology of economy and politics.
The prevailing idea that a focus on certain "legal personal" and
civil rights along with political procedures is the only appropriate
"non-political" human rights activity also affects in important ways
the activities of non-governmental organizations based in the United
States. They have spent little time on issues beyond "violations
against the integrity of the person"-"torture, disappearances, kill-
ing, denials of due process .... ,,45 One justification for this concern
is of course that such issues appear most pressing, but it should be
noted that the focus is consistent with the administration's avoid-
ance of any explicit discussion of power and the distribution of re-
sources. The organizations want to be based on law, and the U.S.
position seems to limit the "non-political" realm quite severely. Al-
most any concern with the quality of life beyond torture and disap-
pearances may be deemed to be political.
The limitations of the approach to international human rights
taken by both the non-governmental organizations and the Reagan
administration are notable for several additional reasons not gener-
ally recognized. The concluding part of this report will suggest some
potential impacts that ought to be considered.
First, the considerable international enthusiasm, at least among
commentators, 46 for a "generational" model of human rights fares
poorly in the United States. The United States either stays away or
is actively hostile to social and economic rights and even more ad-
verse to such ideas as a "right to development." To the extent that
international human rights is supposed to synthesize the positions of
East and West, and North and South, the United States is currently
not willing to go beyond its own traditional ideological position.
Second, there may be a disturbing implication, namely that the
newer claims of right are "luxuries" that must take second place to
the needs for economic growth of individual nations. The Reagan
administration position can be seen as an argument for the primacy
of certain rights and economic growth of a private economy. Other
rights will not be recognized if they challenge the growth. While
this is not the place to develop the argument, note the potential par-
allel to one that can be made by countries more wedded to the eco-
nomic and social rights. They can assert that such "basic" rights and
economic growth are essential, while civil liberties and other indi-
45. Hearings, supra note 32, at 88 (statement of Michael Posner).
46. See, e.g., Sohn, "The New International Law: Protections of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States," 32 American University Law Review 1 (1982).
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vidual rights must take second place to the requirements for growth
(not necessarily under a market economy).
Finally, the current position in the United States may have an
impact in particular situations. The best example is probably the
condition of migrant workers from Mexico who seek employment in
the United States. At present there are millions of undocumented
workers in the United States without permission to be there.47 The
current situation is characterized by many as a crisis, but the ques-
tion is what to do about it. One possibility is to allow more immigra-
tion; another is to try harder to control the American borders. A
third is a "rotation system" of guestworkers denied the rights of
U.S. citizens or even the possibility of becoming such citizens.48
Such a system has been rejected since the 1960s on "human rights"
grounds, but the argument today is increasingly that guestworkers
make good "economic" sense because they promote growth and limit
the expenditures of the welfare state. It appears that U.S. policy is
moving strongly in that direction under the current administra-
tion.49 Some commitment to economic and social rights might make
such a policy questionable. 50 The question, put simply, is whether
the United States treats foreign workers as mere factors of produc-
tion or as entitled to a certain base of human rights including, for
example, the following one enumerated in the Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake
to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Cove-
nant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as
to race, colour, sex .... national or social origin,... or other
status
Developing countries, with due regard to human rights
and their national economy, may determine to what extent
they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the
47. See generally P. Brown and H. Shue, eds., The Border that Joins: Mexican
Migrants and U.S. Responsibility (Totowa: Towman & Littlefield, 1982).
48. The assumption of a rotation or pure migrant worker system is that the
workers will depart rather than utilize such welfare state benefits as unemployment
insurance; they are supposed therefore to absorb the fluctuations of the market.
49. Pear, "U.S. Plans to Ease Alien Labor Rules," N.Y Times, January 27, 1985,
at 1 col. 5.
50. For perspectives on the human rights issues, contrasting the domestic eco-
nomic orientation with emerging, but not yet accepted, human rights perspectives,
see United Nations, Migrant Workers: Pertinent Legislative and Administrative
Regulations on the Welfare of Migrant Workers and their Families (New York,
1983). See also Chaney, "Migrant Workers and National Boundaries: The Basis for
Rights and Protections," in Boundaries 37 (P. Brown & H. Shue eds., Totowa, N.J.:
Rowman & Littlefield, (1981); Garth, "Migrant Workers and Rights of Mobility in
the United States and Western Europe," in Forms and Potential for a European
Identity (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J. Weiler eds., forthcoming 1985).
AGGRESSIVE SMUGNESS
present Covenant to non-nationals. 51
The idea is that nationals and non-nationals should be treated com-
parably in developed nations. The rotation system of guestworkers
rejects that idea.
CONCLUSION
The United States today takes human rights very seriously both
domestically and in foreign policy, but the vision of human rights is
a relatively narrow one. With respect to the domestic situation,
there has been a pronounced unwillingness to become participants
in the systems set up by the major international human rights trea-
ties. While there has been some increased willingness to invoke cus-
tomary law in the U.S. courts, those situations will be infrequent
and not very disruptive. Pride in U.S. accomplishments, in short,
does not lead many to want to submit to international measures.
The U.S. approach to human rights in other nations, both his-
torically and in recent years, reflects the domestic smugness. The
emphasis has been on the extremes of torture and disappearances,
colored especially in this administration by an overriding anti-com-
munism. And even those who do not share that aspect of the ad-
ministration's ideology also are restrained in their approaches to
what is and is not within the domain of human rights for activist
groups. The ideal promoted in foreign policy is a gradual evolution
of market economies toward economic growth, less domestic repres-
sion of dissident groups, and more or less open elections.
The danger is that this image fails to accommodate other views
of economic priorities and the relative importance of particular poli-
cies and individual rights. The "double standard" is by now a rou-
tine criticism by everyone against everyone else in international
affairs, and most countries are guilty to some extent. It is clear that
the administration believes in a double standard-market economies
are entitled to the benefit of any doubt, while countries that appear
to be socialist or communist are questioned. Elections in Nicaragua
are looked at very differently from elections in El Salvador. It may
be that this double standard encourages some of the other notorious
double standards in the world.
Finally, as noted above, the U.S. unwillingness to embrace the
ideas of other views of human rights may help promote policies
based on economic expediency and inconsistent with the high ideals
to which many in the United States aspire. There will be important
domestic debates in the next few years on precisely this important
51. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Art. 2.
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question: the line between the domain governed by "economic ra-
tionality" and the domain governed by claims of right.
